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Abstract
This paper tests for income-related reporting heterogeneity in self-
assessed health (SAH). It also constructs a synthetic measure of clinical
health to decompose the eﬀect of income on SAH into an eﬀect on clin-
ical health (which is called a health production eﬀect) and a reporting
heterogeneity eﬀect. We find health production eﬀects essentially for low-
income individuals, and reporting heterogeneity for the choice between
the medium labels i.e. “fair” vs. “good” and for high-income individuals.
As such, SAH should be used cautiously for the assessment of income-
related health inequalities in France. It is however possible to minimize
the reporting heterogeneity bias by converting SAH into a binary variable
for poor health versus other health statuses.
1 Introduction
Health inequalities have been the subject of a lively literature in Economics
(Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer, 2000). Their calculation requires a good measure
of individual health. In this perspective, this paper assumes that the key vari-
able of interest for the design of public policies is clinical health. Suppose
now that Health Authorities need a tool for monitoring income-related health
inequalities in the general population. Such a tool should have the following
properties: on the one hand, the measure of clinical health should be reliable;
on the other hand, the data should be collected at a low cost. The latter is
especially important for Health Authorities that operate at a local level, as they
may not have many resources to devote to the follow-up of health inequalities.
An objective measure of clinical health is usually expensive to collect, since
data collection has to be based on a costly array of medical check-ups, which
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may induce a significant selection bias. An alternative might be to use self-
reported clinical conditions, but the information that the agent has available
results from her choice to collect information (via preventative health consulta-
tions for example). Moreover, constructing a synthetic health measure requires
the weighting of diverse clinical health conditions, and thus often embodies the
individual preferences of a sub-sample of the population (Gerdtham et al., 1999,
Dolan, 2000).
Given these arguments, a self-assessed health measure may be interesting.
One widespread measure that we use in this paper is obtained by asking in-
dividuals to classify their health using ordered qualitative labels such as “very
good”, “good”, “fair” and “poor”: subjective health Hi is then an ordered qual-
itative variable with M levels. This self-assessed health measure is cheap and
easy to collect, is synthetic by construction, and is strongly correlated with a
number of clinical health conditions (see Idler and Benyamini, 1997, and van
Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003). However, its reliability is questionable, be-
cause a given clinical health condition is appreciated diﬀerently according to
individual characteristics and more particularly the cultural and historical con-
text, individual social status and individual health history (Boltanski, 1971;
Johansson, 1991; Heyink, 1993; Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Sadana et al.,
2000; Wu, 2001; Murray et al., 2001). Reporting heterogeneity does not matter
if one believes that subjective health contains valid information on health be-
yond all potentially available clinical health measures. However, this position
may have untenable consequences in terms of public health policy. A striking
example from Murray and Chen (1992), and Sen (1993) shows that self-reported
health is much lower in the U.S. than in the Indian state of Kerala, although
the mortality rate is higher in the latter (for another example see Case and
Deaton, 2005). As far as possible, we would certainly prefer to invest more in
Kerala than in the U.S. We therefore assume that clinical health is the target
outcome for public health policies. From this position, reporting heterogeneity
may be considered as a bias in the sense that self-assessed health (SAH) is a
biased measure of clinical health.1
This paper considers the presence of reporting heterogeneity in self-assessed
health in France. More specifically, we ask whether this reporting heterogeneity
is related to income, since this point is crucial for the measurement of health
inequalities.
A number of papers in Health Economics have already considered income-
related reporting heterogeneity in SAH. Current results are mixed. For in-
stance, Humphries and van Doorslaer (2000), using Canadian data, as well as
Hernandez-Quevedo et al. (2004), in British data, report results indicating that,
for a given level of clinical health, lower income individuals are more likely to
report a poor level of SAH than higher income groups. On the contrary, Jür-
gens (2006) finds in German data that richer respondents tend to understate
1Shmueli (2003) uses the term “reporting heterogeneity”. Other articles evoke “state-
dependent reporting bias” (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995), and “scale of reference bias”
(Groot, 2000).
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their clinical health in their SAH assessment. Hence, the magnitude and the
sign of reporting heterogeneity seem to be country-specific. In the perspective
of international comparisons, it is worth testing if there are also income-related
reporting heterogeneities in France.
This article uses French data from the 2001 Conditions de Vie des Ménages
survey to address this question. Conceptually, the eﬀect of income on Hi can
be decomposed into an eﬀect on clinical health, which is a random (unobserved)
variable eHi, and an eﬀect on the transformation T [.;Q] of eHi into Hi, where
Qi is the set of variables that aﬀect reporting. Two methods are proposed to
test for income-related reporting heterogeneity. The first method identifies the
presence of reporting heterogeneity using specific and arguably strong paramet-
ric assumptions (this is our Test 1). The second method relies on a synthetic
proxy measure of clinical health based on a classification of individuals, which
results from a latent class analysis of a number of clinical health conditions self-
reported in our data. This second method allows us to assess the sign and the
magnitude of reporting heterogeneity (this is our Test 2).
Our main finding is that there is some income-related reporting heterogeneity
in SAH in France. Our estimates also reveal that the “eﬀect” of a rise in income
on SAH varies according to the individual’s initial income and initial SAH level.2
Three results should be emphasised. First, for individuals at the bottom of the
income distribution reporting poor SAH, income significantly aﬀects SAH via
clinical health. Second, a fall in income has a strong negative reporting eﬀect on
the richest reporting good or very good health. Third, it is the choice between
the medium labels (“fair” vs. “good”) which seems to be the most aﬀected
by reporting heterogeneity, whatever the income level. Hence, the utilisation
of SAH information may bias the measure of health inequality, except if we
use a dichotomous measure of SAH distinguishing between the bottom category
(“poor”) and the other categories.
The paper is organised as follows. Section two explains the methods. Section
three presents the data. The results are found in Section four, and are discussed
in Section five. Section six concludes.
2 Models and Methods
2.1 The generalised ordered probit model
We suppose that clinical health eHi is linked to a set of variables Xi by a linear
index equation:
eHi = α0 +Xiα+ei (1)
where α is a vector of parameters, α0 is a constant, and ei is an error term
capturing unobservable terms. To measure the eﬀect of income on eHi, we have
2The rest of the paper uses the term “eﬀect” somewhat abusively, since income is potentially
endogenous.
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to identify α in equation (1). The reporting equation linking the observable
variables is:
Hi = T [α0 +Xiα+ei;Qi] (2)
The function T (.; .) and the error term e are thus nuisance parameters.
When there is common agreement regarding evaluation of SAH, i.e. when
everyone agrees on what it means to be in very good/good/fair/poor health,
the interpersonal comparability of health is assured. The relation (2) reduces
to Hi = T [α0 + Xiα + ei]. We can then suppose that there exist cut-points
s0, s1..., sM such that
s0 = −∞, sM =∞,
∀m = 1, ...,M, Hi = m ⇐⇒ sm−1 ≤ eHi ≤ sm
with the identification restriction α0 = 0: when ei is distributed normally, this
relation defines the ordered probit model.
We can relax the hypothesis of common agreement by supposing that the
cut-points are idiosyncratic si0, si1..., siM such that
si0 = −∞, siM =∞, (3)
∀m = 1, ...,M − 1, sim = Qiβm
∀m = 1, ...,M, Hi = m ⇐⇒ sim−1 ≤ eHi ≤ sim
where βm are additional parameters, and Q includes a constant. Reported
health Hi then depends on the way in which clinical health eHi is translated
by the cut-points (si0, si1..., siM ). This model, in which the cut-points depend
on observable variables, is a generalised ordered probit model (Terza, 1985).
It is particularly well-suited to cross-section data. In panel data, it is possible
to estimate semi-parametric ordered logit models in which the cut-points are
individual nuisance parameters (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004).
2.2 Assessing the presence of reporting heterogeneity: Test
1
Suppose that (1) is a reduced form equation for health capital production: Xi
only includes prices and resources, especially income, that aﬀect health invest-
ment. We will first estimate specification (A):
eHi = αXi +eAi
si0 = −∞, siM =∞, (4)
∀m = 1, ...,M − 1, sim = βmXi
∀m = 1, ...,M, Hi = m ⇐⇒ sim−1 ≤ eHi ≤ sim
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All of the variables here potentially influence both the cut-points and clinical
health, i.e. Qi = Xi. The generalised ordered probit model poses substantial
interpretation problems when Qi and Xi overlap. In this case, a movement in
income can aﬀect both reporting (i.e. the transformation of eHi into Hi) and
clinical health eHi. The specification we use renders the separation of these two
eﬀects impossible a priori. To illustrate the problem, note that the probability
of observing reply m can be written as:
Pr(Hi = m) = Φ[Xiβm −Xiα]− Φ[Xiβm−1 −Xiα] (5)
= Φ[Xi(βm − α)]− Φ[Xi(βm−1 − α)]
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal resid-
uals eAi (their variance has to be normalised to 1 as usual).3 This probability
can also be written for any vector of parameters δ as:
Pr(Hi = m) = Φ[Xi(βm + δ)−Xi(α+ δ)]− Φ[Xi(βm−1 + δ)−Xi(α+ δ)]
= Φ[Xi(βm − α)]− Φ[Xi(βm−1 − α)] (6)
or again for any couple of vectors α1 and α2 such that α = α1 + α2 as:
Pr(Hi = m) = Φ[Xi(βm − α1)−Xiα2]− Φ[Xi(βm−1 − α1)−Xiα2)]
= Φ[Xi(βm − α)]− Φ[Xi(βm−1 − α)] (7)
The structural models associated with these probabilities diﬀer with respect
to the specification of the cut-points sim and the modelisation of eHi. For
the models associated with equation (6) we have eHi = Xi(α + δ) + ei and
sim = Qi(βm + δ); for those associated with (7) we have eHi = Xiα2 + ei and
sim = Xi(βm − α1). Hence equation (1) is not identified, because any variable
which has an eﬀect on eHi also potentially influences the cut-points (see the
equivalence between equations (5) and (7)), and any variable playing a role in
the determination of the cut-points may equally aﬀect eHi (see the equivalence
between equations (5) and (6)).
Following Hernandez-Quevedo et al. (2004), a first approach to test for
the presence of income-related reporting heterogeneity assumes that a variable
aﬀects individual reporting if it has a heterogeneous eﬀect on the diﬀerent cut-
points of the generalised ordered probit model.4 Indeed, Specification (A) iden-
tifies γm = (βm −α) for m = 1, ...,M − 1. A variable then has a heterogeneous
3The model thus identifies coeﬃcients scaled by the variance. Homoscedasticity is assumed
throughout the paper.
4The epidemiological literature uses the technical term of “response category cut-point
shift” (Sadana et al., 2000 and Murray et al., 2001; also used by Lindeboom and van Doorslaer,
2004).
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eﬀect on the cut-points if the coeﬃcients βm associated with this variable vary
according to the cut-point m. This can be tested by a Hausman test of the
equality of the coeﬃcients γm (Pudney and Shields, 2000). In the rest of this
article, we shall call this test Test 1.
What are the main drawbacks of this approach? Some variables may not
have a heterogeneous eﬀect on the cut-points, but a homogeneous eﬀect i.e.
they do not aﬀect diﬀerentially the cut-points. This is an index-shift eﬀect, as
the literature calls it, and may be interpreted in terms of reporting heterogene-
ity or in terms of production of ”clinical health”. This point has two major
consequences. First, Test 1 can detect some kinds of reporting heterogeneity,
but not a reporting heterogeneity that involves a common eﬀect on all the cut-
points. Second, Test 1 does not allow us to draw conclusions about either the
magnitude of reporting heterogeneity or the eﬀect of income on clinical health.
Focusing on income-related reporting heterogeneity, Test 1 may reject ho-
mogeneity of income eﬀects, and thus accept reporting heterogeneity, because
the link between income and eHi is badly specified. Hence, estimating Specifi-
cation (A) may identify reporting heterogeneity, but only under the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 The relationship between income and clinical health eHi is
correctly specified.
To guard against a potential specification bias, we use a set of eight dummy
variables measuring household income: the relationship between income and
clinical health is thus specified in a very flexible manner. However, this does
not remove out the possibility that the marginal eﬀect of income may vary at
diﬀerent points in the clinical health distribution.5
The first approach thus hinges on a strong assumption and is unable to iden-
tify reporting heterogeneity to its full extent. A number of diﬀerent strategies
can be imagined to overcome this diﬃculty of identification. Groot (2000) sup-
poses for instance that si1 = 0 for all individuals: one of the two extreme SAH
categories constitutes a common anchoring point. This hypothesis identifies
separately α and a part of the βm. van Doorslaer and Jones (2003) appeal to
the correspondence, for any sub-group of the population, between the distribu-
tion of SAH and the distribution of a synthetic measure of clinical health, the
Health Utility Index.
5A key implication of assumption 1 is that there is no slope heterogeneity in the relationship
between income and clinical health. To understand this point, imagine that subjective health
is a continuous variable. We would then run quantile regressions instead of estimating a
generalized ordered probit model. Slope heterogeneity between quantiles could be interpreted
as expressing merely diﬀerences in the marginal eﬀect of income on clinical health between
diﬀerent points of the clinical health distribution, instead of reflecting some kind of reporting
bias. However, this interpretation would hold only if individuals are ordered in the same
manner according to their subjective health or to their clinical health. That orderings diﬀer
according to clinical health or to subjective health, is precisely what we appeal to for the
identification of reporting heterogeneity.
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In the current paper, we are interested in the identification of the income
eﬀect on the cut-points. To achieve this goal, we adopt a third strategy proposed
by Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) and Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004):
the use of a proxy measure of clinical health.
2.3 Assessing the magnitude of reporting heterogeneity:
Test 2
Including in Xi a synthetic measure of clinical health that has, by assumption,
no eﬀect on the cut-points helps to isolate the income-related reporting hetero-
geneity. Let H0 be a synthetic measure of clinical health for which the following
conditional mean independence condition holds:
Assumption 2
E( eH|H0, Y, Z) = E( eH|H0, Z) (8)
where Y is income and Z denotes the other right hand side variables (X =
(Y,Z)). Our second approach does not require that clinical health be perfectly
measured, but that there exists a proxy measure of clinical health, which cap-
tures all the components of clinical health that are aﬀected by income. One can
arguably consider that Assumption 2 is weaker than Assumption 1.
Having this proxy measure in hand, we will estimate specification (B), which
consists of the following equations:
eHi = δ1H0 + δ2Zi +eBi (9)
si0 = −∞, siM =∞,
∀m = 1, ...,M − 1, sim = β1mYi + β2mZi = βmXi (10)
∀m = 1, ...,M, Hi = m ⇐⇒ sim−1 ≤ eHi ≤ sim
Since we assume for the sake of parsimony that H0 picks up only the eﬀect
of income on clinical health, we keep the Zi variables in the health production
equation. Under Assumption 2, specification (B) identifies the eﬀect of report-
ing heterogeneity on income. Hence, our second test (Test 2) for the presence
of income-related reporting heterogeneity is whether income has a significant
eﬀect on SAH in specification (B).
The main requirement of Test 2 is the existence of a proxy measure of
clinical health that captures the eﬀect of income on the various dimensions of
clinical eﬀect. In this perspective, Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) use the
Hopkins Symptom Checklist and Lindeboom and van Doorslaer (2004) rely on
the Health Utility Index. As we do not have a ready-made measure available, we
construct our own by a latent class analysis of a number of self-reported clinical
health conditions. One may argue that introducing all self-reported clinical
health conditions in the vector Xi avoids any loss of information. However,
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constructing a synthetic proxy measure of clinical health yields two benefits.
First, our approach is more parsimonious in that we do not overload the model
with too many parameters. Second, using a synthetic measure minimizes the
impact that random or systematic measurement errors on each indicator may
have on the estimates (this is discussed in the “Data” section hereafter).
By comparing estimation results from specification (A) and (B), one can
decompose the eﬀect of income on SAH into a reporting and a "clinical health"
production eﬀect. However, the direct comparison of the income coeﬃcients
resulting from the estimation of (A) and (B) does not permit us to identify the
eﬀect of income on eHi, since the variances of both eAi and eBi are normalised to
1. We therefore compare the marginal eﬀects of income between specifications
(A) and (B), to evaluate the impact of income on the production of clinical
health.
3 Data
We test for reporting heterogeneity in SAH in France, using data from the “En-
quête Permanente sur les Conditions de Vie des Ménages” survey (EPCV2001),
carried out by the INSEE (the French National Statistical Agency) in 2001. This
survey contains information at both the household and the individual level, and
one randomly-drawn individual in each household answered a health question-
naire. The starting sample thus consists of 5194 individuals in the same number
of households. In the perspective of estimating Specification (B), it is diﬃcult
to construct clinical health indicators that are valid for both younger and older
adults, due to the natural depreciation of health with age, as suggested by the
existence of specific health measures for the elderly that are not available in our
data.6 This is why respondents aged over 65 were dropped. We analyse the
sub-sample of respondents having finished their schooling and under 65 years of
age at the time of the interview, so as to use the variables referring to education.
Given missing values, this leaves us with a sample of 2956 individuals.
This section presents descriptive statistics regarding the key variables, as
well as the method that we use to construct the synthetic indicator of clinical
health.
3.1 SAH and Income
SAH is measured by the question “Would you say that your current health status
is very good, good, fair, poor, bad or very bad”. The last three ordered response
categories are grouped together due to small cell sizes. The SAH variable thus
consists of four ordered categories: very good, good, fair, poor.
6A number of limitations that are fairly specific to the older populations are not measured
in the survey: reading skills, writing skills, memory skills, being able to pursue activities that
require moderate levels of energy (going for a walk, climbing the stairs, washing oneself), etc.
Such variables are present for instance in the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) data.
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In the estimation sample, 52% of respondents say that they are in good
health and only 6% are in poor health. Women are more likely to say that they
are in poor health than men: 7.1% vs. 4.5% respectively. There are two distinct
periods in the evolution of SAH with age: up to age 40, health is good, and the
variance of self-reported health decreases with age; afterwards there is a gradual
degradation of self-reported health with age, with increasing variance.
We tested variables such as social class, debt, and labour market status to
capture individuals’ economic and financial status. Preliminary analyses reveal
that the variables which were the most strongly correlated with clinical health
and SAH were education and income.
Education is measured by four dummy variables for: no qualifications, CEP
or Brevet des collèges (QUAL1 ); a short or long technical qualification (CAP,
BEP, Technical or Vocational Baccalauréat: QUAL2 ); a general Baccalauréat
(QUAL3 equivalent to an A-level); or higher education (QUAL4 ). SAH is pos-
itively correlated with education. In particular, the least-educated individuals
are more likely to say that they are in “poor” health than the other respondents
(11.3% against 4% respectively).7 This correlation may result from an age ef-
fect, with older respondents likely being on average less well-educated due to
increasing access to secondary and higher education over the past thirty years.
However, older respondents are also richer.
Income is defined at the household level. This is yearly income, net of
social contributions, and not equivalised. It is measured by nine categori-
cal variables: under 9,000 Euros/year (noted as INCOME1 ), from 9,000 to
12,000 (INCOME2 ), from 12,000 to 15,000 (INCOME3 ), from 15,000 to 18,000
(INCOME4 ), from 18,000 to 22,500 (INCOME5 ), from 22,500 to 27,000 (IN-
COME6 ), from 27,000 to 36,000 (INCOME7 ), from 36,000 to 45,000 (IN-
COME8 ), over 45,000 (INCOME9 ). A higher level of household income is
associated with a better level of SAH (see Figure A2, Appendix A).
The correlation between income and SAH may reflect two diﬀerent eﬀects.
First, higher income is associated with a better clinical health, via greater in-
vestment in health. Second, for a given clinical health status, perceived health
status may rise with income, perhaps because the individual feels more secure.
This paper proposes a test of the two explanations.
3.2 Clinical Health Measures
The estimation of specification (B) requires a measure of clinical health. The
EPCV 2001 survey includes a number of diﬀerent questions regarding individ-
ual physical and psychological health. We know about the serious or chronic
illnesses from which the individual suﬀers. SAH is worse when the individual
suﬀers from one of the more common serious illnesses: nervous illnesses, prob-
lems of the digestive system, paralyses, cancers, cardio-vascular problems, or
7The 2001 reform of health coverage, which aﬀorded everyone the same health coverage
regardless of their income only came into eﬀect at the time the survey was carried out, and is
unlikely to aﬀect the socio-economic gradient.
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musculoskeletal troubles. Nervous illnesses and paralyses are the most strongly
associated with lower levels of SAH. Other clinical health variables are used:
teeth and eyesight problems, being currently treated for an illness, having a
psychiatric treatment, having had a fever of over 39◦c in the past year, four
dummy variables for the body mass (thin, normal, overweight, obese). Last,
we use several indicators that link clinical health to every day living, such as
not being able to exercise, to work or to give blood, having a limited mobility,
reporting some stress or a feeling of loneliness.
As these measures are self-declared, we may worry that they reflect income-
related heterogeneity in individual access to health, and therefore the informa-
tion that individuals possess. A number of these variables are actually strongly
correlated with income, which determines access to healthcare. Replies to these
questions could indicate both clinical health problems and inequities in the ac-
cess to health care. In France, everyone is covered by Social Security with a
reimbursement rate of 75%, and 92% of the French population have additional
health insurance. Finally, the most costly diseases are treated in hospital, which
reduces drastically the individual cost of health. Only teeth and eyesight cares
are poorly reimbursed by Social Security.8 The use of psychological health
variables (feelings of loneliness, self-reported stress, and psychiatric treatment)
is also open to criticism. However, the mental well-being is an important di-
mension of health, and several measures of clinical health, such as the Health
Utility Index, include psychological measures in their construction, as well as
other self-reported health conditions.9
We use these self-reported clinical health conditions to build a synthetic in-
dexH0. A number of diﬀerent techniques can be used to sum up the information
contained in these clinical health measures. The best-known are factor analysis,
latent class analysis (LCA, see Goodman, 1974; Bandeen-Roche et alii, 1997;
McLachlan and Peel, 2000, chap. 5.12) and the Grade of Membership method
(GoM, see Portrait et al., 1999). The LCA and GoM approaches split the pop-
ulation up into classes, in such a way that the clinical health indicators are
independent conditional on class membership. The LCA method supposes that
probabilities of class membership are equal across individuals, contrary to the
GoM approach. However, the asymptotic properties of the GoM method are
unknown, and the only sure way of using GoM techniques is to assume that the
probabilities of class membership follow a certain distribution, which imposes
parametric restrictions (Erosheva, 2002). This is one reason why we appeal to
8More generally, we propose here a “partial equilibrium” analysis that excludes feedbacks.
For instance, self-reported health conditions are diagnosed by the medical institutions only
if the individual visits a doctor. But visits to doctors are determined by income and the
subjective perceptions of one’s own health. For instance, it is known that poorer respondents
experience health problems younger and may not be well-diagnosed by the health care system
(Jougla et al. 2000).
9We tested the robustness of our results by dropping the “suspect” health variables (psy-
chological health, teeth, and eyesight) and re-estimating the full model. The results did not
change significantly.
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LCA analysis.10
On the basis of the Integrated Laplace Criterion, we choose to classify the
sample into 6 latent classes, which can be considered as ordered with reference
to the mean values of the clinical health variables in each class (see Table A.2.
in Appendix A).11 The first two classes, which represent 40.7% and 15.2% of the
sample, are characterised by the absence of serious health problems. However,
individuals in the second group are all overweight. The large percentage figure
of those with no chronic disease is explained by the absence of individuals aged
over 65. The third class accounts for 13.7% of the sample, with members who
are not ill, but are more likely to spend time in hospital, see their doctor and
take medicine regularly, take more time oﬀ of work, and are more likely to suﬀer
psychologically (feeling alone or stressed). The fourth class covers 17.6% of the
population, and is similar to the third class, but more so. Restrictions on giving
blood and ischemic illnesses are more frequent. The last two classes include
individuals who are most likely to report the health problems we consider, with a
slight diﬀerence between the two groups. In the fifth class (6.5% of the sample),
the probability of psychological problems is higher, while in the sixth class
(6.3% of the sample), physical health problems are more prevalent: diﬃculties
in walking, not being able to take part in sporting activities, a diminished
ability to work, needing help. Table A.3. in Appendix A also reports the
distribution of SAH by class of ”clinical health”: it clearly shows that there
is positive correlation between these two synthetic measures of health. Tables
A.4. to A.6. illustrate the central idea of this paper. They decompose the SAH
distribution by income category and clinical health class, and clearly reveal a
positive correlation between SAH and income conditional on clinical health.
For instance, the rate of respondents who are in excellent clinical health (Class
1) and in good or very good SAH rises from 91% to 97.2% between income
categories 5 and 9. Under Assumption 2, this diﬀerence might reflect the
presence of reporting heterogeneity. Specification (B) tests this explanation in
a multivariate regression setting.
In the regressions, we introduce linearly the estimated probabilities that the
individual belongs to each one of the six classes, since they represent expected
values of class memberships. The omitted category is the first class, that of
10The latent class model treats the "clinical health" variables as manifest indicators of a la-
tent variable: “clinical health”. As such, these observable indicators are considered as diﬀerent
measures of a same unobservable construct: following the terminology of the structural mod-
elling literature, this is a measurement model (Bollen, 1989). Bandeen-Roche et alii (1997)
propose a nice application of LCA to the relationship between a set of covariates and a set of
indicators for clinical health. Using measurement models minimizes the impact that random
or systematic measurement errors on each self-reported indicator may have on the estimates
of specification (B). In the context of the current paper, applying a latent class model also
oﬀers several advantages over factor analysis. First, factor analysis can not be applied to
qualitative indicators. Second, the results of a factor analysis are not unique, since the factors
need to be rotated to be interpretable. Third, factor analysis assumes multivariate normality.
11The Integrated Laplace Criterion balances the gain in information from adding one class
with the loss in the precision of the classification (McLachlan and Peel, 2000). More details
on the LCA are available upon request from the authors.
11
individuals with no serious health problems.
3.3 Other control variables
It is possible that local cultural eﬀects explain both diﬀerences in clinical health
and the degree of optimism that the individual expresses about her health. The
health Atlas in France shows sharp diﬀerences in mortality rates between re-
gions (Salem et al., 1999). We include as explanatory variables the region and
classification of residential area: rural (STRATA1 ); urban with under 20 000
inhabitants (STRATA2 ); urban with between 20 000 and 100 000 inhabitants
(STRATA3 ); and urban with over 100 000 inhabitants (STRATA4 ). In addi-
tion, we introduce controls for the individual’s marital status.
4 Estimation results
This section presents the results of generalised ordered probit estimation of spec-
ifications (A) and (B). Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B show the estimation
results. Table B1 presents the results for the variables which, in specification
(A), have a homogeneous eﬀect on the cut-points, according to Test 1, which
is applied to each group of variables separately, i.e. we test regional dummies,
then sex, then age etc. Table B2 shows the results with respect to the variables
which do have diﬀerential eﬀects on the diﬀerent cut-points. For each specifica-
tion, the first column shows, for comparison purposes, the results from simple
ordered probit estimation with common cut-points. The second column shows
estimation results from generalised ordered probit models. In Table B2, for each
specification, columns 2 to 4 show the results for the three cut-points with a
sign reversal to ease the interpretation in terms of health eﬀects (i.e. coeﬃcients
−β1,−β2,−β3).
4.1 The socioeconomic determinants of SAH
Specification (A), which does not include information on clinical health, mea-
sures the correlations between the socioeconomic variables and SAH. Sex, age
(measured as a second-order polynomial), education, marital status and type
of residential area have a homogeneous eﬀect on the cut-points.12 However,
region and income have a heterogeneous eﬀect on the cut-points. Under As-
sumption 1, this means that there is some region- and income-related reporting
heterogeneity in SAH.
The results of a simple ordered probit, which does not take into account
reporting heterogeneity, are fairly standard (the first column of Table B1): male
12We tested for a break in the age trend at age 40, as indicated by our descriptive analysis of
the age/self-assessed health correlation. It turns out that, everything else being equal, there
is no significant break. Other econometric specifications of the age eﬀect were tested with no
significant improvement.
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has a positive estimated coeﬃcient on reported health, as does income or living
in the West of France; age has a negative eﬀect. On the other hand, lower levels
of education attract negative coeﬃcients. The results of the generalised ordered
probit are more judicious (second column of Table B1). In particular, amongst
the variables which do not aﬀect the cut-points diﬀerentially (according to Test
1), only sex and being unqualified are significant: males are more likely to say
that they are in good health. Having no education has a negative eﬀect and, as
we are controlling for income, this result is consistent with a basic assumption
of the demand for health model: the eﬃciency of health production rises with
education (Grossman, 1972). Age has a decreasing convex eﬀect on SAH.
Region dummies have a significant eﬀect on individual perceptions of health.
The omitted category is living in Paris. Those living in the West or the Ile-de-
France are less likely to say that they are in poor health.
There is a positive correlation between SAH and income. Being poor (income
categories 1 to 3 out of 9) is negatively correlated with the declared level of
health, the estimated coeﬃcients being significant for all of the cut-points. While
poverty increases the probability of being in poor health, those in middle or
higher income classes are not significantly more or less likely to report poor
health: income does not protect against poor health, it is rather poverty that
is a risk factor. There is also a significant diﬀerence between the eﬀect of
being in the medium to high income categories (3 to 8) and the highest income
class (category 9) on the probability of reporting very good health. In sum, the
hypothesis of a homogeneous correlation of income with the cut-points is rejected
in favour of heterogeneous correlations (Test 1, P-value=0.005 ). Hence, under
Assumption 1, there is income-related reporting heterogeneity in SAH.
4.2 Clinical and self-Assessed Health
Specification (B) introduces the clinical health measure constructed in sub-
section (3.2), which identifies under Assumption 2 income-related reporting
heterogeneity.The results are presented on the right-hand side of Tables B1 and
B2 in Appendix B. Following Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) and Lindeboom
and van Doorslaer (2004), we introduce our synthetic measures of clinical health
into the index only (equation (9)). The coeﬃcients on the diﬀerent classes of
clinical health exhibit the expected negative relationship, given the description
of these classes above: the relationship between clinical and self-assessed health
is monotone positive. Sex no longer has an impact on health and being di-
vorced is associated (somewhat surprisingly) with better health. The eﬀects of
education and regions are not diﬀerent from those in specification (A).
In this specification, income has still a positive, significant and heterogeneous
eﬀect on the cut-points. Hence, underAssumption 2, that income is significant
provides some evidence that there is income-related reporting heterogeneity in
SAH. This result is of interest because it diﬀers from that in Lindeboom and
van Doorslaer (2004) on Canadian data, who find heterogeneous eﬀects for age
13
and sex, but not for income. The diﬀerence in results between countries might
be interpreted as reflecting heterogeneity in reporting between countries. The
following section considers in more detail the relationship between SAH and
income, paying particular attention to the magnitude of reporting heterogeneity.
5 The magnitude of reporting heterogeneity
This section describe how reporting heterogeneity aﬀects the predicted distrib-
utions of SAH, and provide some evidence in favour of non-linearity in income
eﬀects by initial level of SAH. It also compares the marginal eﬀects between the
two specifications to demonstrate the eﬀect of income on clinical health. Since
specification (A) shows the total marginal eﬀect of income on SAH, while speci-
fication (B) indicates the marginal eﬀect of income via reporting heterogeneity,
the diﬀerence between the two yields the eﬀect of income on the production of
clinical health.
5.1 Marginal eﬀects
Using estimates from specification (B), we can estimate the eﬀect of an income
increase on the SAH through reporting heterogeneity. The size of this eﬀect will
help determine the usefulness of SAH as a potential indicator for income-related
health inequalities. Marginal eﬀects for a discrete choice model depend crucially
on the choice of values for the explanatory variables (see Greene, 2003, p. 668).
A first and widely used solution is to use average sample values including the
sample mean of clinical health. For each level of SAH m, the change in the
probability of reporting health greater than m when the individual moves from
the income category j to j + 1 is:
Pr(H > m|Y = j + 1,H0 = H0, Z = Z)− Pr(H > m|Y = j,H0 = H0, Z = Z)
Under Assumption 2, these diﬀerentials represent the way in which reporting
heterogeneity aﬀects the distribution of SAH for the average individual. Table
C.1. in Appendix C reports these probability changes for diﬀerent values of m
and j. If we consider changes greater than 1% in absolute values, we see that
reporting heterogeneity aﬀects the middle of the distribution of SAH (fair and
good), and is also larger at the extremes of the income distribution. Whereas
there is almost no income-related reporting heterogeneity for those reporting
poor health, we observe greater reporting heterogeneity for the more aﬄuent
in very good health. However, although a number of marginal eﬀects are fairly
large, our estimates are somewhat imprecise. Confidence intervals for these
changes were calculated using the delta-method. It turns out that 22 changes out
of 24 are insignificant at the 5% level.13 Hence, the marginal eﬀects computed
13As pointed out by a referee, the probability that 2 out of 24 estimates are significantly
diﬀerent from 0 at the 5% level - even if the true value is 0 - is about 35%.
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at the sample mean show that income-related reporting heterogeneity has a
negligible eﬀect on the clinical health/subjective health gap.
However, a second approach to computing marginal eﬀects is to estimate
for each individual the impact of the transition from income category j to in-
come category j + 1 on the probability of declaring health greater than m. For
specification (B), the individual eﬀect is then:
∆(B)i = Pr(H > m|Y = j+1,H0 = H0i , Z = Zi)−Pr(H > m|Y = j,H0 = H0i , Z = Zi)
These marginal eﬀects can be interpreted as the probability of leaving the health
categories inferior or equal to m as the individual changes from income category
j to j+1. They are calculated for each individual i. For each j, we compute these
individual eﬀects over the sub-sample of those individuals who are in income
range j only, and the individual confidence interval at the 5% level. This can
be interpreted as an “eﬀect on the treated”. Figure C1 reports the percentage
of individuals in each income category for whom the reporting heterogeneity is
significant at the 5% level. Here, the picture is somewhat diﬀerent from that
obtained for the average individual. We clearly see that reporting heterogeneity
is quite large for those in fair or good health whatever the income level, but
also for those in poor health. The pattern is less easy to interpret for those in
good or very good health, or in the middle of the income distribution (especially
income categories 4 to 7). Hence, computing individual marginal eﬀects instead
of marginal eﬀects for the average individual changes our conclusion regarding
reporting heterogeneity: the latter plays a fairly important role for transitions
from fair to good health level, but a minor role for exits from a poor health level
or transitions to very good health (except for the more aﬄuent). This reporting
heterogeneity is to an extent convex in income.
5.2 Reporting heterogeneity vs. health production
We now decompose the total health-income correlation in to a health production
eﬀect and reporting heterogeneity. Individual marginal eﬀects are calculated
for specification (A) as follows:
∆(A)i = Pr(H > m|Y = j + 1, Z = Zi)− Pr(H > m|Y = j, Z = Zi)
These individual eﬀects represent the total impact of an income change on the
individual predicted distribution of SAH. Figure C2 in Appendix A displays the
proportion of respondents in each income category for whom the total income
eﬀect is significant at the 5% level. Income clearly aﬀects the distribution of SAH
for individuals in low-income households. For each j, we average the individual
eﬀects for specifications (A) and (B) over the sub-sample of those who are in
income range j. These average individual marginal eﬀects are represented, with
the diﬀerence between them, in Figures C.3. to C.5. in Appendix C, which
correspond to the three health states in which the individual may initially find
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herself (m = 1,m = 2, andm = 3). The graphical representation of specification
(A), given by the dotted line, shows the total eﬀect of income on health. The
eﬀect due to reporting heterogeneity results from specification (B), and is shown
by the thick black line. The thin line, which is the diﬀerence between these two,
shows the eﬀect of income on health production.
Two major conclusions can be drawn from our estimates and are summarized
in Figure 1. First, the health production eﬀect of a rise in income seems partic-
ularly large for those in the lowest income range (under 12000 Euros), whatever
the SAH level m we consider. This implies that income has declining marginal
productivity in health production, and is consistent with standard results in the
literature on the health production eﬀect of income among the poorest (Deaton,
2003). This income gradient in health production is also found when one mod-
els the probabilities of membership of ”clinical health” classes as a function of
income and other covariates. The regression results that are reported in Table
C.2. in Appendix C show however that income does not influence the probabil-
ity of membership of all ”unhealthy” classes. For instance, income plays a major
role for membership of class 3 but not membership of class 4. This could reflect
diﬀerences in equality of access to health care according to the pathologies. In-
deed, class 4 attracts more individuals with ischemic problems, who are eligible
for Social Security, while individuals in class 3 declare more often problems or
health conditions that are not eligible (teeth, migraines, assistance at home).
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Summary of the results.
6 Conclusion
This article has proposed and implemented two diﬀerent appraoches to testing
for the existence of reporting heterogeneity in SAH. The first relies essentially
on the assumption that the marginal eﬀect of income on clinical health does not
vary with the position in the clinical health distribution. Hence, heterogeneous
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income eﬀects on the diﬀerent cut-points are interpreted as evidence of income-
related reporting heterogeneity: this is our Test 1. The second approach uses
a proxy measure of clinical health to control for the eﬀect of income on clinical
health, and interprets any remaining impact of income on SAH as reporting
heterogeneity. This is our Test 2, which is based on arguably weaker identifying
assumptions thanTest 1. Further, Test 1 does not enable us to detect reporting
heterogeneity, when the latter has a homogeneous eﬀect on the cut-points, while
this is not the case for Test 2. Both approaches produce some support for the
existence of income-related reporting heterogeneity.
Using the proxy-based approach (Test 2 and Specification B), our esti-
mates reveal that reporting heterogeneity is convex in income, which can be
interpreted as an optimism bias for the rich and a pessimism bias for the poor.
However, this result relies heavily on the assumption that all of the clinical
health production eﬀect of income is captured by the introduction of the self-
reported clinical health conditions available in the survey. The validity of this
assumption may be questionable if we do not capture all of the relevant income-
related dimensions of clinical health. For instance, if there is a pro-rich bias in
access to health care, as one may suppose a priori, then the eﬀect of income on
clinical health is underestimated, and income-related reporting heterogeneity is
over-estimated for low-income individuals. In some sense, our work provides an
upper-bound evaluation of income-related reporting heterogeneity for the less
well-oﬀ, and a lower bound evaluation of the eﬀect of income on their clinical
health, which we have called a clinical health production eﬀect although this
term might be excessive. Indeed, we are fully aware that we identify correla-
tions rather than causalities, given that SAH determines the demand for health
which, in turn, aﬀects income (see Adams et al., 2003).
The starting point and the limits of our exercise are clear: we focus on SAH
as a cheap measure of clinical health, which is considered as the true objective
of public health policies, even if one would not base a major change in health
policies on SAH alone. Our results call for caution in the use of SAH measures
for assessing income-related health inequalities in French data. In particular, we
find that, for those in the middle of the SAH distribution, a rise in income seems
to aﬀect SAH mainly via reporting (a noticeable exception being individuals in
low-income households). As a consequence, binary indicators constructed from
self-reported health may be used, but only if the “poor health” category is taken
as a reference. The results provided here could be checked by a fairly new and
promising third method: that of vignettes (King et al., 2004).
Last, the reporting heterogeneity that we have identified for the well-oﬀ in
good health should be followed up in future work, in particular with respect to
medical care and prevention. It would be interesting to consider a joint model
of health demand and evaluation of SAH, given that the information used by
the individual to evaluate her health depends on the consumption of medical
services.
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APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS. 
 
Table A1. Variable definitions and main statistics 
 
 Definition Mean 
Male =1 if male 43.1% 
Age Age 43.1 
(11.6) 
STRATA1 Urban area = rural 24.8% 
STRATA2 Urban with less than 20,000 inhabitants 16.3% 
STRATA3 Urban, between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants 13.8% 
STRATA4 Urban more than 100,000 including Paris  45.1% 
Income1 Household income <9,000 Euros /yr (converted from 
French Francs to Euros) 
8.3% 
Income2 9,000-11,999 Euros/year 8.3% 
Income3 12,000-15,000 Euros/ year 10.9% 
Income4 15,000-18,000 Euros/ year 10.2% 
Income5 18,000-22,500 Euros/ year 14.2% 
Income6 22,500-27,000 Euros/ year 14.2% 
Income7 27,000-36,000 Euros/ year 16.3% 
Income8 36,000-45,000 Euros/ year 9.1% 
Income9 >45,000 Euros/ year 8.5% 
Qual4 =1 if education over the Baccalaureat (A-level) 27.3% 
Qual3 =1 if Baccalaureat passed 34.2% 
Qual2 =1 if has a degree under the Baccalaureat 12.3% 
Qual1 =1 if no education 26.2% 
SINGLE =1 if single 30.6% 
WIDOWED =1 if widowed. 3.7% 
DIVORCED =1 if divorced 12.1% 
MARRIED =1 if married 53.6% 
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of subjective health by household income category 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Poor Fair Good Very Good
Subjective Health
%
Income1
Income2
Income3
Income4
Income5
Income6
Income7
Income8
Income9
 
 22
Table A.2. Objective health conditions by class of clinical health 
 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% of the sample (N=2956) 40.7% 15.2% 13.7% 17.6% 6.5% 6.3% 
Immunity 
Has had a fever over 39°c in the past year 3% 3% 6% 3% 6% 16% 
Use of health care 
Follows psychiatric treatment 1% 1% 8% 5% 69% 54% 
Has regular check-ups for chronic disease 0% 0% 26% 79% 59% 96% 
Has to take medicines regularly 9% 17% 38% 93% 95% 100% 
Has had a hospital stay in the past year 7% 7% 22% 15% 23% 53% 
Has been assisted at home for medical reasons more than 3 
months in the last year 
0% 0% 11% 1% 4% 30% 
Chronic illnesses that have been diagnosed 
Nervous system 0% 0% 1% 2% 3% 5% 
Digestive system 1% 2% 11% 8% 20% 25% 
Strain injury 0% 0% 5% 2% 0% 18% 
Cancer 0% 0% 1% 4% 0% 11% 
Heart 1% 3% 2% 41% 23% 32% 
Joints 3% 5% 24% 21% 32% 47% 
Other illnesses 3% 3% 21% 43% 24% 45% 
Frequent migraines 2% 2% 10% 5% 14% 17% 
Psychological troubles 1% 1% 10% 1% 52% 46% 
Mental well-being 
Feels sometimes stressed (ref: no stress) 33% 36% 28% 32% 13% 18% 
Feels often stressed (ref: no stress) 23% 20% 37% 21% 35% 31% 
Feels very often stressed (ref: no stress) 10% 9% 22% 11% 52% 40% 
Feeling of loneliness 7% 7% 18% 8% 47% 39% 
Limitations to capabilities 
Medical restrictions for blood donations 5% 4% 14% 39% 32% 68% 
Medical restrictions for sport 0% 2% 11% 10% 3% 64% 
Medical conditions limit working capabilities 0% 1% 16% 10% 24% 74% 
Mobility limited 0% 0% 12% 1% 4% 36% 
Teeth pain moderate (ref: none) 26% 25% 32% 17% 32% 27% 
Teeth pain severe (ref: none) 5% 6% 12% 6% 9% 12% 
Eyesight problems 56% 67% 68% 85% 89% 89% 
Thin (BMI<18.5) 7% 0% 3% 2% 6% 4% 
Overweight (25<BMI<30) 0% 100% 19% 34% 38% 20% 
Obese (BMI>30) 9% 0% 5% 17% 7% 22% 
 
 
Table A.3. Distribution of subjective health by class of clinical health 
 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Subjective health = poor 0.5% 0.5% 5.0% 5.7% 16.9% 46.5% 
Subjective health = fair 8.5% 10.8% 27.9% 35.3% 50.5% 45.1% 
Subjective health = good 58.8% 64.4% 54.7% 50.6% 29.0% 6.8% 
Subjective health = very good 32.2% 24.4% 12.4% 8.4% 3.7% 1.7% 
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Table A.4. Percentage of respondents reporting very good SAH by income category and class 
of clinical health (in %) 
 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Income1 17.8 18.1 8.1 3.7 2.9 4.5 
Income2 24.3 28.8 2.6 5.2 8.2 3.6 
Income3 32.6 25.0 8.1 4.2 0.1 0 
Income4 26.9 31.2 11.3 11.2 3.7 0 
Income5 35.3 25.2 11.7 7.8 4.8 0.3 
Income6 34.5 17.4 17.1 12.0 0.6 0.0 
Income7 32.1 24.2 16.1 5.9 2.9 0.0 
Income8 32.9 16.5 13.4 4.9 0.2 0.0 
Income9 43.9 37.4 22.1 16.5 10.0 0.3 
 
Table A.5. Percentage of respondents reporting good or very good SAH by income category 
and class of clinical health (in %) 
 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Income1 78.7 61.9 53.6 30.7 11.3 8.4 
Income2 81.9 84.4 55.4 43.9 28.2 7.4 
Income3 90.0 80.9 61.7 46.6 29.1 0.8 
Income4 88.5 97.9 61.1 55.7 36.1 1.3 
Income5 91.0 88.9 66.4 57.5 44.6 8.8 
Income6 92.6 90.5 70.8 65.2 39.2 5.8 
Income7 94.9 90.5 74.9 69.5 30.1 14.3 
Income8 93.5 94.2 77.0 65.2 44.8 51.1 
Income9 97.2 93.1 82.8 73.0 56.1 6.5 
 
Table A.6. Percentage of respondents reporting good or very good SAH by income category 
and class of clinical health (in %) 
 
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Income1 3.7 4.6 10.9 17.1 35.5 47.3 
Income2 0.2 0.0 16.1 10.1 19.1 67.6 
Income3 0.0 0.3 4.0 12.1 18.5 39.3 
Income4 0.8 0.0 3.8 4.9 14.8 35.1 
Income5 0.2 0.0 3.1 1.3 4.7 45.5 
Income6 0.0 0.0 2.1 3.1 13.2 46.4 
Income7 0.4 1.1 2.2 4.4 11.9 23.8 
Income8 1.1 0.0 4.6 5.3 16.9 31.2 
Income9 0.0 0.0 3.7 2.8 2.5 80.5 
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APPENDIX B. RESULTS. 
 
Table B1. Variables that do not have a differential effect on the thresholds 
 
Specification A B 
Statistical model Ordered Probit (α) Generalized 
Ordered Probit (α)
Ordered Probit (α) Generalized Ordered 
Probit (α) 
Observable variables independent of the thresholds 
Objective Health: 
class 1 
No No Reference Reference 
Objective Health: 
class 2 
No No -0.127* 
(0.068) 
-0.126* 
(0.068) 
Objective Health: 
class 3 
No No -0.997*** 
(0.074) 
-1.003*** 
(0.075) 
Objective Health: 
class 4 
No No -1.153*** 
(0.092) 
-1.153*** 
(0.093) 
Objective Health: 
class 5 
No No -1.754*** 
(0.113) 
-1.769*** 
(0.114) 
Objective Health: 
class 6 
No No -2.720*** 
(0.116) 
-2.753*** 
(0.119) 
Male 0.153*** 
(0.042) 
0.151*** 
(0.042) 
0.043 
(0.044) 
0.043 
(0.044) 
STRATA1 0.050 
(0.057) 
0.049 
(0.057) 
-0.035 
(0.059) 
-0.032 
(0.059) 
STRATA2 -0.058 
(0.063) 
-0.060 
(0.063) 
-0.048 
(0.065) 
-0.052 
(0.065) 
STRATA3 -0.008 
(0.066) 
-0.011 
(0.066) 
0.025 
(0.068) 
0.022 
(0.068) 
STRATA4 Reference Reference Reference Reference 
QUAL1 -0.209*** 
(0.065) 
-0.214*** 
(0.065) 
-0.175*** 
(0.067) 
-0.181*** 
(0.068) 
QUAL2 -0.064 
(0.058) 
-0.070 
(0.058) 
-0.034 
(0.060) 
-0.039 
(0.060) 
QUAL3 0.054 
(0.073) 
0.052 
(0.073) 
0.096 
(0.075) 
0.097 
(0.076) 
QUAL4 Reference Reference Reference Reference 
AGE/10 -0.641*** 
(0.144) 
-0.614*** 
(0.144) 
-0.645*** 
(0.149) 
-0.627*** 
(0.150) 
(AGE/10)2 0.042** 
(0.016) 
0.039** 
(0.016) 
0.059*** 
(0.017) 
0.057*** 
(0.017) 
SINGLE -0.002 
(0.054) 
-0.006 
(0.054) 
0.029 
(0.056) 
0.026 
(0.056) 
WIDOWED -0.163 
(0.114) 
-0.143 
(0.115) 
-0.044 
(0.120) 
-0.033 
(0.121) 
DIVORCED 0.047 
(0.069) 
0.052 
(0.069) 
0.147** 
(0.071) 
0.154** 
(0.072) 
MARRIED Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Threshold intercepts. ordered probit model only 
Threshold 1: s1 -4.088*** 
(0.324) 
No -4.814*** 
(0.338) 
No 
Threshold 2: s2 -3.008*** 
(0.321) 
No -3.353*** 
(0.334) 
No 
Threshold 3: s3 -1.420*** 
(0.318) 
No -1.504*** 
(0.329) 
No 
Notes: Std. Error in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at 
the 10% level. 
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Table B2. Variables that have a differential effect on the thresholds  
 
Specification A B 
Model Ordered Probit Generalized Ordered Probit Ordered Probit Generalized Ordered Probit 
Thresholds None (linear 
index: α) 
Poor / 
Fair:-β1 
Fair / 
Good : -β2
Good / 
Very Good 
: -β3 
None (linear 
index: α) 
Poor / Fair 
: -β1 
Fair / Good 
: -β2 
Good / Very 
Good: -β3 
Paris Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Ile-de-France 0.070 
(0.076) 
0.325** 
(0.148) 
0.024 
(0.096) 
0.055 
(0.096) 
0.116 
(0.079) 
0.358** 
(0.175) 
0.087 
(0.104) 
0.095 
(0.100) 
West 0.134* 
(0.080) 
0.486***
(0.167) 
0.163 
(0.103) 
0.021 
(0.103) 
0.224*** 
(0.083) 
0.716*** 
(0.204) 
0.304*** 
(0.115) 
0.063 
(0.107) 
East -0.056 
(0.084) 
0.171 
(0.164) 
-0.185* 
(0.105) 
0.015 
(0.107) 
-0.002 
(0.086) 
0.276 
(0.200) 
-0.143 
(0.115) 
0.067 
(0.112) 
North -0.099 
(0.091) 
0.105 
(0.171) 
-0.180 
(0.115) 
-0.071 
(0.125) 
-0.009 
(0.095) 
0.357* 
(0.211) 
-0.084 
(0.128) 
-0.037 
(0.131) 
Center -0.022 
(0.079) 
-0.089 
(0.142) 
-0.016 
(0.101) 
0.004 
(0.103) 
0.079 
(0.082) 
0.014 
(0.173) 
0.112 
(0.112) 
0.085 
(0.108) 
Southwest -0.028 
(0.082) 
0.191 
(0.153) 
-0.074 
(0.103) 
-0.056 
(0.108) 
0.022 
(0.085) 
0.208 
(0.179) 
-0.011 
(0.112) 
0.002 
(0.112) 
Mediterranean 0.048 
(0.080) 
0.101 
(0.145) 
-0.013 
(0.101) 
0.107 
(0.105) 
0.001 
(0.083) 
0.168 
(0.180) 
-0.048 
(0.112) 
0.007 
(0.110) 
INCOME1 -1.099*** 
(0.113) 
-1.014***
(0.197) 
-1.174***
(0.140) 
-0.876***
(0.152) 
-0.884*** 
(0.118) 
-0.734*** 
(0.238) 
-0.987***
(0.155) 
-0.664*** 
(0.161) 
INCOME2 -0.798*** 
(0.111) 
-0.813***
(0.200) 
-0.849***
(0.138) 
-0.623***
(0.142) 
-0.713*** 
(0.115) 
-0.698*** 
(0.244) 
-0.790***
(0.151) 
-0.531*** 
(0.149) 
INCOME3 -0.548*** 
(0.103) 
-0.382* 
(0.203) 
-0.628***
(0.131) 
-0.472***
(0.126) 
-0.542*** 
(0.106) 
-0.239 
(0.249) 
-0.628***
(0.145) 
-0.510*** 
(0.133) 
INCOME4 -0.479*** 
(0.103) 
-0.260 
(0.211) 
-0.515***
(0.133) 
-0.479***
(0.127) 
-0.448*** 
(0.106) 
-0.072 
(0.260) 
-0.491***
(0.147) 
-0.468*** 
(0.133) 
INCOME5 -0.386*** 
(0.095) 
-0.065 
(0.211) 
-0.444***
(0.125) 
-0.384***
(0.114) 
-0.384*** 
(0.098) 
0.042 
(0.262) 
-0.462***
(0.137) 
-0.389*** 
(0.120) 
INCOME6 -0.301*** 
(0.093) 
-0.134 
(0.203) 
-0.296** 
(0.124) 
-0.326***
(0.113) 
-0.318*** 
(0.096) 
-0.015 
(0.253) 
-0.325** 
(0.137) 
-0.349*** 
(0.118) 
INCOME7 -0.238*** 
(0.090) 
0.021 
(0.206) 
-0.133 
(0.123) 
-0.355***
(0.109) 
-0.313*** 
(0.093) 
-0.074 
(0.249) 
-0.204 
(0.136) 
-0.422*** 
(0.113) 
INCOME8 -0.232** 
(0.099) 
-0.138 
(0.217) 
-0.077 
(0.136) 
-0.368***
(0.123) 
-0.309*** 
(0.102) 
-0.285 
(0.259) 
-0.132 
(0.149) 
-0.440*** 
(0.129) 
INCOME9 Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Intercept No 3.754***(0.353) 
3.003***
(0.329) 
1.384***
(0.324) 
No 4.395*** 
(0.385) 
3.359*** 
(0.344) 
1.507*** 
(0.336) 
Notes: Std. Error in parentheses. *** significant at the 1% level. ** significant at the 5% level. * significant at 
the 10% level. 
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APPENDIX C. MARGINAL EFFECTS. 
 
Table C1. Reporting bias (in percentage points) at the sample mean  – specification (B) 
Initial income ∆Pr(H>1) ∆Pr(H>2) ∆Pr(H>3) 
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 0.3% 7.5% 2.4% 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 2.8% 5.8% 0.4% 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 0.5% 4.5% 0.9% 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 0.3% 0.9% 1.7% 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 -0.1% 4.0% 0.9% 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 -0.1% 3.2% -1.7% 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 -0.7% 1.7% -0.4% 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 0.9% 2.8% 11.7% 
Ref: over 45 000 €. INCOME9 
Note: Marginal effects computed at the sample mean for all characteristics. These effects represent changes in 
the probability of declaring a health status over the figure indicated in the top of the column. The changes are in 
percentage points. They are generated by an income increase such that the individual changes from income 
category k to income category k+1 where the initial income category k is shown on the left. The figures in bold 
are significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table C2. Relative risk of membership of “clinical health” classes by income category. 
 
Class of “clinical health” 2 3 4 5 6 
Income category  
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 1.022 2.171 0.976 2.158 9.956 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 1.134 1.972 1.045 1.322 5.502 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 1.260 1.495 0.721 1.011 3.197 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 1.258 1.910 0.879 0.780 3.162 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 1.169 1.634 0.891 0.870 2.108 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 1.211 1.362 0.922 0.671 2.055 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 1.078 1.201 0.735 0.545 1.054 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 1.172 1.262 0.751 0.511 1.180 
Note: These figures represent the relative risk of being in the “clinical health” class j over the first “clinical 
health” class when the individual is in income category k instead of being in the top income category 
(INCOME9). These relative risk ratios are computed by supposing that the class membership probabilities follow 
a multinomial distribution conditional on income and the other control variables in Tables B1 and B2 (see Etilé, 
2006, for more details on this technique). The relative risk ratios in bold are significant at the 5% level. 
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Figure C1. Specification B – Significance of the individual marginal income effects. 
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Figure C2. Specification A – Significance of the individual marginal income effects. 
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Note: Figures C1 and C2 show for each income category the % of individuals for whom a given marginal effect 
is significant at the 5% level. 
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Figure C3. Probability of reporting SAH greater than poor. 
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Note: Figures C3 to C5 represent average individual marginal effects of income on the probability of reporting 
health greater than 1, 2 or 3. The individual effects are averaged over individuals who are actually in the specific 
income categories. The "reporting heterogeneity" line is computed using estimates from specification (B), and 
the "total effect" line using estimates from specification (A). The "health production" line is simply the average 
of differences between marginal effects from (A) and from (B). 
 
Figure C4. Probability of reporting SAH greater than fair. 
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Figure C5. Probability of reporting SAH greater than good. 
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ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS: MAIN RESULTS. 
 
 
1/ Separate regressions. 
 
Individuals in households with 1.5 consumption units or less. 
 
Table C1. Reporting bias effect (percentage in  points) – specification (B) 
Initial income ∆Pr(H>1) ∆Pr(H>2) ∆Pr(H>3) 
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 0.3% 13.6% 2.9% 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 3.1% 2.0% 0.4% 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 1.2% 5.4% 0.5% 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 0.3% 2.5% 2.2% 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 0.1% 4.1% 0.1% 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 0.2% 4.8% -0.6% 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 -3.6% 0.6% -0.6% 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 3.3% 2.6% 9.1% 
Ref: over 45 000 €. INCOME9 
 
 
Individuals in households with more than 1.5 consumption units. 
 
Table C1. Reporting bias effect (percentage in  points) – specification (B) 
Initial income ∆Pr(H>1) ∆Pr(H>2) ∆Pr(H>3) 
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 0.5% -19.2% -2.9% 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 1.5% 21.7% 3.4% 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 -0.3% 3.6% 3.1% 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 0.2% -1.0% 2.7% 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 -0.2% 4.0% 1.7% 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 -0.4% 2.4% -1.8% 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 0.7% 1.8% -0.8% 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 -0.4% 2.9% 14.5% 
Ref: over 45 000 €. INCOME9 
Test threshold heterogeneity – P-value = 0.604 (specification A) 
 
 
2/ Dropping teeth, eyesight and psychological variables from the list of indicators 
 
Table C1. Reporting bias effect (percentage in  points) – specification (B) 
Initial income ∆Pr(H>1) ∆Pr(H>2) ∆Pr(H>3) 
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 0.8% 6.3% 2.5% 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 2.7% 6.0% 1.4% 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 0.5% 4.9% 0.3% 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 0.1% 0.9% 2.0% 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 0.0% 5.7% 1.5% 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 -0.1% 2.6% -1.5% 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 -0.3% 3.4% 0.1% 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 0.6% 1.4% 12.2% 
Ref: over 45 000 €. INCOME9 
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3/ Controlling for the number of consumption units (ln(uc) is included as a regressor in the cut-points). 
 
Table C1. Reporting bias effect (percentage in  points) – specification (B) 
Initial income ∆Pr(H>1) ∆Pr(H>2) ∆Pr(H>3) 
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 0.3% -4.2% 0.0% 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 2.7% 0.3% -1.4% 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 0.5% 0.4% 0.1% 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 0.2% 0.5% 0.0% 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 -0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 -0.1% 0.7% 0.1% 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 -0.6% 0.8% 0.1% 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 0.9% 1.9% 0.9% 
Ref: over 45 000 €. INCOME9 
Test of threshold heterogeneity (specification A) – P-value = 0.066 
 
But there is no health production effect if we compute the latter by the difference between the results of 
specification (A) and specification (B). 
 
Table C2. Relative risk of membership of “clinical health” classes by income category. 
 
Class of “clinical health” 2 3 4 5 6 
Income category  
Less than 9 000 €/year:  INCOME1 0.950 1.971 0.898 1.608 10.107 
Between 9 000 and 12 000€: INCOME2 1.044 1.776 0.955 1.000 5.513 
Between 12 000 and 15 000€: INCOME3 1.181 1.373 0.672 0.810 3.190 
Between 15 000 and 18 000€: INCOME4 1.194 1.787 0.830 0.649 3.194 
Between 18 000 and 22 500€: INCOME5 1.126 1.554 0.854 0.744 2.140 
Between 22 500 and 27 000€: INCOME6 1.181 1.316 0.897 0.624 2.046 
Between 27 000 and 36 000€: INCOME7 1.057 1.172 0.719 0.510 1.058 
Between 36 000 and 45 000€: INCOME8 1.156 1.238 0.740 0.489 1.179 
Note: These figures represent the relative risk of being in the “clinical health” class j over the first “clinical 
health” class when the individual is in income category k instead of being in the top income category 
(INCOME9). These relative risk ratios are computed by supposing that the class membership probabilities follow 
a multinomial distribution conditional on income and the other control variables in Tables B1 and B2 (see Etilé, 
2006, for more details on this technique). The relative risk ratios in bold are significant at the 5% level. 
 
